Via della Vasca Navale 79. 00146 R o m . lraly (colini,gdb,parrigna} @dia.unimmS. if Abstract Tunnels are widely used to improve security and to expand networks without having to deploy native infrastructure, and play an important role in the migration to IPv6. In this paper we introduce a number of techniques to detect, and collect information about, IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels. We also show how a known tunnel can be used as a "vantage point" to launch third-party tunnel-discovery explorations, scaling up the discovery process. We describe our Tunneltrace tool, which implements the proposed techniques, and validate them by means of a wide experimentation on the 6bone tunneled network. on the GARR network, and through the test boxes deployed worldwide by the RIPE NCC as part of the Test Traffic Measurements Service. We assess to what extent 6bone registry information is coherent with the actual network topology, and we provide the first experimental resulu on the current distribution of IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels in the Internet, showing that even "native" networks reach more than 60% of all IPv6 prefixes through tunnels.
Introduction
Tunnelling consists in the encapsulation of the packets of a network protocol within the packets of a second network protocol, such that the former regards the latter as its datalink layer. Because of the flexibility it provides, tunnelling is widely used both to expand networks without having to deploy native infrastructure 120, I I ] and to improve security [14. 121. Tunnels play an important role in the migration to IPv6, and several types of IPv6 tunnels are defined! including configured tunnels and automatic tunnels, 6104.
ISATAP, and Teredo: IPv6 may also use GRE tunnels over I h 4 . Our results show that
IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels are very common in the Internet today; we expect this to be true for some time, as IPv4 network infrastructure will remain widely deployed for many years.
Tunnel discovery is the process of automatically detecting tunnels and determining their endpoints. Similarly to other network discovery problems. iu importance derives from the need for up-to-date information about network topology, and from the impact [21] .
From a practical perspective, the ability to discover tunnels can be useful in several scenarios. One example is troubleshooting: if a link in the tunnel's path fails, the tunnel fails. and an IPv6 traceroute will not reveal the source ofthe problem. The ability to determine that the failed link is in a tunnel, and possibly perform an IPv4 traceroute between the tunnel endpoints, would greatly aid debugging. Secondly, tunnels are often used as an interim solution until native IPv6 infrastructure is in place. Tunnel detection techniques provide the means to follow the evolution of the IPv6 Internet from its origin as a completely tunneled network towards a completely native network, and determine how much has to be done lo complete the migration to native IPv6. They can also provide insights into the structure of the network itselt for example, as the cost of a tunnel is much lower than that of a native link, predominantly tunneled regions may be more densely interconnected than native regions. The knowledge of these prnperties will aid the development of realistic IPv6 topology generators. Finally, tunnels offer lower performance than native links and are often used as backup paths in case of problems; the knowledge of whether a particular route contains a tunnel would allow routing protocols to prefer native routes. This is useful for Internet service providers and content delivery operators who wish to maximize the quality of service they provide.
Much has been written on the topic of IPv4 topology discovery. which is usually performed by interacting with the network using probing packets [4, 231 or through the observation of routing information, notably BGP tables [7] , bridge forwarding tables [2], or IGP routing tables obtained via SNMP [I] . The combination of these approaches and the use of advanced techniques has led to the development of tools which achieve very good results in relatively little time 123, I, 71. However. tunnel discovery differs from other types of network discovery in that a tunneled network is made up of two distinct network layer topologies that interact, and the resulting network is thus a complex "overlay" of two forwarding planes (Figure 1 ), whose topology cannot be deduced simply by applying known methods to explore each plane separately. The impact of tunnel discovery is also potentially more significant than that of other types of topology discovery because tunnels are more dynamic than physical links (and can be automatically generated [8]) and because they can undermine both performance, as all the links in the tunnel appear to be a single hop, and security, as the our techniques based on IP spoofing clearly illustrate.
A possible method is the use of SNMP queries to obtain information directly from the nodes involved. This is impractical: not only does it require administrative access to network equipment, and thus cannot be used to discover tunnels in the Internet at large, but the required MlBs are not yet finalized [9] , and the specific tunnel MIB is very rarely implemented. Another method was outlined in [3] . but it does not apply to existing infrastructure and it envisages authentication mechanisms, and thus has the same drawbacks as the use of SNMP. In this paper, we discuss methodologies for tunnel discovery that do not require administrative access to the network and thus may be applied to the Internet in general. A limited list of our contributions is as follows:
We introduce techniques to infer the existence of IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels, confirm the existence of inferred tunnels, and collect information about tunnel endpoints. We show how a tunnel, once discovered, can be used as a "vantage point" to launch third-party tunnel-discovery explorations.
We describe Tunneltrace, a tool which uses our techniques to detect tunnels between a vantage point and a destination. We validate the techniques through wide experimentation, first on the 6bone tunneled network, then on native networks accessible through the GARR network and the test boxes deployed worldwide by the RIPE NCC as part of the Test Traffic Measurements Service. As a byproduct of our experimentation, we are able to assess to what extent information in the 6hone registry is coherent with the actual network topology.
. Finally, we provide the first experimental results on the current distribution of tunnels in the Internet. showing that tunnels are very common and that the percentage of native IPv6 connectivity is still very low.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly provides the basic definitions and notations used both in Section 3, which introduces and formally describes our tunnel discovery techniques. and in Section 4, which describes Tunneltrace. Section 5 describes our experimentation and discusses OUT results. We conclude in Section 6. 
Preliminary definitions

lhnnel discovery methods
In this section, we present a number of techniques we developed to tackle the tunnel discoveryproblem. Depending on their objective, they may be divided into: (i) techniques to infer the existence of tunnels, (ii) techniques to confirm their existence, (iii) techniques to collect information about their endpoints, and (iv) techniques which allow a host to interact with the network as if it were located in a different place to the one in which it is actually located (rhird parry e.rplorarion techniques). Table 1 Classification of tunnel discovely techniques.
IPv4 address of the packet is the IPv4 address of the tunnel source. This allows any host to cause the tunnel endpoint to emit arbitrary IPv6 packets by encapsulating them in IPv4 packets with spoofed source addresses. Hop Limit manipulation The Hop limit field in the IPv6 header specifies the maximum number of routers a packet may pass through. When a router receives a packet with the Hop Limit field equal to I it discards it and sends the packet's source an ICMPv6 error message, thus revealing its IPv6 address.
IPv6
Routing header While source routing is prohibited in the majority of IPv4 networks, many IPv6 routers honor the IPv6 Routing header, which permits a host sending a packet to specify a list of nodes that the packet is to pass through. Combined with Hop Limit manipulation, the Routing header can be useful for determining the addresses of point-to-point interfaces and tunnel interfaces in particular. The remainder of this section is devoted to a formal presentation of the main techniques we have devised. Each technique is expressed by means of a formal rule, which is identified by a number and by a shon name. Table 1 classifies the rules according to their objective. Although each rule is expressed by means of an implication, the validity of the implication is not absolute, and in real-world conditions a rule may fail to apply due to nonstandard behavior, misconfiguration, or unexpected and uncommon network topologies. Data on the validity of the rules will he provided in section 5. Rule 1 (MTU) Consider the sequence of links that make up the path between some interface X and some other interface Y. We may think of each link as a point-to-point link, because each packet that traverses a link is sent by exactly one of the interfaces on the link and is received by exactly one of the interfaces on the link'. Thus, if we number the links in the path progressively starting from I, for each we may define a source interface A ( i ) and a destination interface B(i), which have IpV6 addresses A,j(i) and & ( i ) (Figure 2 bytes. Hence, if we consider two consecutive links i -1 and i on the path, we may write: Z, an lPv6 packet encapsulated in an IPv4 packet with source and destination addresses Aq and Bq. Because its source address is AA,, when the packet arrives at B it will be recognized as aniving from the tunnel and will be decapsulated and processed as if it had been sent by A (see Figure 3(a) ). Formally, we may write: whether there is a tunnel T = ( A , B ) by applying Rule 3, with Xg = 26, to inject an echo request packet addressed to any routable interface Y . The packet will arrive at interface B; if there is no tunnel between A and B, it will be discarded. Otherwise, it will be forwarded to its destination Y, which will reply with an echo reply message addressed to Zg. If the injecting host receives a reply, there is a tunnel (Figure 3(b) ). More formally.
Z : [ .~~& [ Z G & echo-request]] D [YgZg echo-reply]:Z + Tunnel(A. B )
Rule 6 (Dying packet) Given a tunnel T = (A: 8). it is possible to determine the IPv6 address Be of the tunnel destination by injecting a packet with the IPv6 Hop Limit field set to I . Because IPvh-in-IPv4 tunnels are modeled as "single-hop", the packet will appear at interface B without ever having been processed by an IPv6 router. and thus with the contents of the Hop Limit field intact. Upon arrival at interface B , however, the Hop Limit of the packet will be decremented to zero. The resulting "time exceeded" message will anive at Z and the injecting host may determine BG by examining its source address 15. it. Any IPv6 address in T will be routed towards the tunnel, and each tunnel endpoint will route through the tunnel all addresses in T except its own. Thus, if we use Rule 5
to inject an echo request packet with a Hop Limit of 2 and destination address Xg in T but not equal to Bs, the packet will reach B and be sent back through the tunnel to A. If X6 = A g ; then the injecting host will receive an echo reply. Otherwise', it will receive a "time exceeded message with source address Ag. In both cases! it obtains As.
It is simple to determine a suitable value for X s : the length of T must be at most 127, is routed back towards itself; if the Hop Limit HL of this packet is set to the appropriate value, the packet will expire on interface A ( i ) and Z will receive a "time exceeded 
A tunnel discovery tool
In this section we describe T u n n e l t r a c e , a tunnel discovery tool we have developed to test the techniques introduced in Section 3. Although T u n n e l t r a c e is not intended to be the main contribution of our work, which we believe lies in thc techniques themselves, we discuss it here as an example of their application. T u n n e l t r a c e attempts to detect and collect information about tunnels in the path between the exploring host and a userspecified destination. Of course, by applying Rule 4, in principle it is possible, given a sufficient number of vantage points, to find tunnels in the entire network.
The strategy followed by T u n n e l t r a c e is simple: perform a traceroute to the destination host, and for each link i attempt to discover if it is a tunnel. If it is, attempt lo discover the IPv4 addresses of the endpoints, confirm the tunnel's presence, and use it as a vantage point to explore the rest of the path.
Specifically, for each hop in the traceroute Be(i), T u n n e l t r a c e first applies Rule 1 to determine whether link i is a tunnel. If so, it attempts to obtain information about its endpoints in the following way: first, it attempts to obtain the IPv6 address of the previous hop's sending interface, As(i). using Rule 8; then, it uses Rule 2 to attempt to obtain A4(i) and Bl(i), and if it succeeds, it attempts to confirm the presence ofthe tunnel using Rule 5 ; finally, it verifies the information collected by using Rules 6 and I. If the tunnel is confirmed, it is used as a vantage point to explore the rest of the path.
If Rule 2 does not provide enough information to use the tunnel as a vantage point, T u n n e l t r a c e combines it with heuristics on DNS names, attempting to perform piece-'This may still pmvide incorrect m u l u because the asymmcrly may he lacaid between B ( i ) and B(i -2).
If greater accuracy is desired. the inferred value of A,(&) can he compared with Be(<) and accepted only ifit is on the same rubner: however. this will cause false negatives for unnumbered links. Table 2 Status of tunnels in the 6hone registry wise matching as proposed in [ 171, and, if the name contains strings such as "v6-", "ip6.". or "ipv6.". repeating the DNS lookup after removing them. T u n n e l t r a c e also examines names looking for strings that suggest the presence of tunnels (such as ''tunnel" or "tu"), queries the 6bone registry to check whether the node is a known tunnel endpoint, and performs AS lookups: if the IPv4 address of a node is in a different AS as its IPv6 address, or if the hops before and after the node are in different ASS as the node itself, the node may be the endpoint of an interdomain tunnel. In all these cases, T u n n e l t r a c e reports that a tunnel might be present. For each hop, T u n n e l t r a c e also outputs information such as the lh.6 address (and DNS name and AS number) of the answering interface Bs(i) and whether the interface is dual stack. It also provides this information ahout the sending interfaces A ( i ) .
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Experimental results
The 6hone provides a useful experimental testbed for OUT work, as data on tunnels is publicly available in the hbone registry. Thus. applying our techniques to the 6Bone may both (i) allow us to verify the validity of our techniques, and (ii) use our techniques to check the accuracy of the information in the registry itself. We used the tunnel data available in the hbone regisoy in various ways. Firstly, we checked it for consistency, using DNS lookups and packet injection to determine how many tunnels in the tunnel database actually exist. Secondly, we used it as a large list of tunnels against which to check the validity of our tunnel discovery techniques. Finally, we used the list of existing tunnels as vantage points from which to search for tunnels in the IPv6 Internet a1 large.
5.1
We have analyzed the hbone registry a number of times over a two-month period to determine to what degree the information on tunnels it contains is accurate and up-to-date.
For every tunnel. the registry contains the DNS names or IPv4 addresses of the tunnel endpoints, along with other information. We process one tunnel at a time, and attempt to resolve the DNS hostnames of the tunnel endpoints to IP addresses. If both names can he translated to IPv4 addresses, we use Rule 5 to determine whether the tunnel is actually working. The results of our analysis are in Table 2 .
Our results show that almost half of all tunnel records in the registry have invalid DNS names for one or both endpoints and therefore are either out of date or refer to tunnels that no longer exist. About a quarter of the records are working tunnels. A funher third do not
Status of the (hone registry permit packet injection. While some of these may he GRE tunnels andlor have endpoints located in networks that employ ingress filtering, we expect most of them to be inactive: our MTU survey results indicate that GRE tunnels are much less common than IPvh-inIPv4 tunnels, and as the majority of tunnels in the 6bone registry are interdomain tunnels, it is unlikely that ingress filtering has any significant impact on the results. Further study of these undecided cases would allow the development of a tool which could monitor all aspects of the quality of a tunnel registry. As regards variation over time, notwithstanding the short time window in which our observations were made. our results indicate that the 6bone registry is fairly static, and that the quality of tunnel data is marginally improving: the percentage of working tunnels increased from 23.4% on 2003-06-13 to 24.9% on 2003-08-07.This is due to the fact that the total number of tunnels is decreasing, possibly because of the 6bone phaseout [IO].
Rule validity data
The large number of working tunnels provided by the 6bone registry allows us to validate our tunnel discovery techniques against known data: once a tunnel is confirmed using Rule 5, we may check the validity of Rules 2.4.6, and I . Using the 2003-OX-07 dataset, we checked whether these rules applied to the tunnels in the registry that we had confirmed to be working. Of a total sample of 1046 tunnels, we found that Rule 4 (Fragment Injection) applied to 999 tunnels (95.5%) and Rule 6 (Dying packet) applied to 1013 tunnels (96.8%). Rule 7 was tested only on tunnels that did not permit packet injection in both directions, because for these, Rule 6 is much more effective. Of 218 tunnels that were not bidirectional, Rule 7 applied to 151 (69.2%). Together. Rules 6 and 7 allowed us to determine both IPv6 endpoints for 963 tunnels (92. I %).
Rule 2 (DNS) was significantly less useful: of the 963 tunnels for which we knew the IPv6 addresses of both endpoints, it applied to one endpoint in 169 cases (17.5%), and to both endpoints in only 6 cases (0.6%). Though its utility is rather limited, we feel that as it is probably the most obvious of our techniques, our work would not be complete without discussing it and determining its degree of usefulness. Clearly, the techniques that make use of active probing produce significantly better results than can he obtained by querying online sources of information such as the 6bone registq or the DNS.
MTUsurvey
The large number of vantage points obtained from the 6bone registry allows us to use third-pany exploration to evaluate the impact of tunnels in a sizable portion of the IPv6 Internet. Using a sample of 995 vantage points in 92 different Autonomous Systems (AS's; for comparison, the total numher of AS's which announce IPv6 routes is approximately 450), we applied Rule 4 to perform Path MTU discovery from each vantage point to every prefix in the IPv6 routing table. By applying Rule I, we may deduce which paths conlain one or more tunnels and which are native. The results of our analysis, excluding connectivity errors, are in Table 3 .
We note that the most common MTU is 1480 bytes, that of an IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnel, followed by 1280, the minimum IPv6 MTU, which indicates that at least one link in the path has a MTU of 1280 bytes (probably an IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnel on a BSD system). The Internet is still quite low.
5.4
So far we have observed the IPv6 Internet through vantage points that are tunnel endpoints. Since these may be located in portions of the network that are dense in tunnels. we conducted a survey from hosts inside two native IPv6 networks, one in the GARR native lPv6 network and one at RIPE NCC. to discover how tunneled "native" networks really are. From each host we measured the Path MTU to every prefix in the global IPv6 BGP table and applied Rule I to determine whether the path to each prefix contained at least one tunnel. We found that of 417 prefixes in the BGP table at the time of the analysis, the GARR network reached at least 262 (62.8%) through tunnels, while the RIPE NCC network reached at least 291 (71.2%) through tunnels.
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the effect of tunnels on global IPv6 connectivity, we repeated the experiment from the "test-boxes" deployed worldwide by RIPE NCC as part of the Test Traffic Measurements service. About 100 test-boxes are currently active, of which 16 have IPv6 connections. The same prefixes were used for all test-boxes; since not all test-boxes could reach all prefixes, prefixes that were unreachable from B particular test-box were removed from its list so as not to affect the results.
Our results are in Figure 4 . As can he seen from the graph, three of the test-boxes reached almost 100% of the prefixes through tunnels, from which we deduce that they are located in networks which do not have a native IPv6 connection: the others reached between 63.7% and 92.3% of all IPv6 prefixes through tunnels (the column labeled "It average A-P' provides an average for all 16 test-boxes. while the column labeled "11 average E-P, provides the average of all natively connected test-boxes). The results show that global IPv6 connectivity still relies largely on tunnels, even when observed from a native IPv6 network. However, we note that there are non-trivial differences between S u r v e y of "native" I P v 6 networks: how native is native? 
Conclusions
We have introduced Several techniques to infer the existence of IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels, to confirm their existence, and to collect information about their endpoints, outlining a StIalKgy for tunnel discovery along a path and showing how it is possible to use tunnels as "vantage points" to inject packets into the network at multiple locations, performing third-parly exploration and scaling up the discovery process.
By applying our techniques to the 6bone registry, we were able to assess to what degree it is coherent with the actual state of the network, showing that almost half of the information on tunnels is out of date, but that at least one quarter of tunnels present is still functioning. The information in the 6bone registry also allowed us to Verify the validity of our techniques, showing that those which make USK of active probing are very effective, providing resulu for over 90% of the tunnels in the registry we were able to make use of.
We used our techniques to provide the first experimental data on the presence of tunnels in the I h 6 Internet. by measuring the percentage of IPv6 prefixes reached through tunnels from the native GARR and RIPE NCC networks and from the 16 IPv6 test-boxes deployed worldwide by the RIPE NCC as part of the Test Traffic Measurements service. All the networks we tested reached less than 40% of IN6 prefixes natively. showing that global IPv6 connectivity still relies largely on tunnels. Note that our techniques expose, and make use of, security problems inherent in IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels, which do not use any form of authentication except the source address of the IPv4 packet. This allows any host to inject packets into any IPv6 network in which it knows the IPv4 addresses of the endpoints of a tunnel, with Security implications similar to those of source routing. If Security is a factor. we recommend the use of native links, or, if this is not possible, of GRE tunnels [I 31 or keyed GRE tunnels.
